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EDITORIAL COMMENT
PEACE AND WAR: FACTUAL CONTINUUM WITH MULTIPLE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
The literature of international law continues to reveal an increasing
dissatisfaction with the traditional dichotomy of "peace" and "war" and
its attendant allegedly sharp discrimination of relevant, but mutually ex-
clusive, world prescriptions. Many recent writers have described and
deplored the common ambiguous and confused use of the two basic terms,
and some writers have sought, with varying degrees of clarity, to empha-
size that the reference of the terms must be related to particular decision-
makers and the purposes of such decision-makers. 1  Building upon this
dissatisfaction, Professor Jessup has most recently recommended the rec-
ognition and elaboration of a new "state of intermediacy," "a third status
intermediate between war and peace," as a mode of eliminating confusion
in reference and irrationality in policy.2
The purpose of this editorial is to suggest that decisions about "war"
and "peace" are perhaps even more complex than the contemporary
literature yet explicitly recognizes and that a mode of analysis much more
comprehensive and flexible than either dichotomy or trichotomy may be
required if clarity and rationality are to be promoted. It is doubted
whether a trichotomy which makes simultaneous reference both to facts of
the greatest variety and to the responses which many different decision-
makers make to these varying facts for many different purposes can, any
more than a dichotomy of similar reference, do much to dispel ambiguity
and irrationality.
The principal difficulty in our conventional analysis of "peace" and
"war" resides, it is submitted, in this effort to make simultaneous reference
to both "facts" and "legal consequences," to both the event to which
decision-makers are responding and to their responses and prescriptive
justifications for responses, by the invocation of a small number of ab-
solutistic terms. This effort is, for example, most apparent in the often
quoted and approved definition of war offered by Judge Mloore. The
passage reads:
I The most cited studies are Grob, The Relativity of War and Peace (1949), and
Eagleton, "The Attempt to Define War," International Conciliation, No. 291 (1933).
See also Wright, A Study of War (1942), Vol. 1, p. 10; Stone, Legal Controls of
International Conflict (1954), p. 312; Schwarzenberger, "Ins Pacis ac Belli," this
JoURNAL, Vol. 37 (1943), p. 460; McNair, "The Legal Meaning of War and the
Relation of War to Reprisals," Grotius Society Transactions, Vol. 11 (1926), p. 29;
Ronan, "English and American Courts and the Definition of War," this JouRNAL,
Vol. 31 (1937), p. 642; Borchard, "War and Peace," this JOURNA_, Vol. 27 (1933), p.
114; Tucker, "The Interpretation of War under Present International Law," Inter-
national Law Quarterly, Vol. 4 (1951), p. 11 (with an excellent statement of the in-
dispensability of the distinction between permissible and non-permissible violence).
The thrust of the Grob study is admirable but its conceptualism is often muddy,
including demands for "right" answers, and it seeks to relate definitions more to
existing technical "rules" than to particular problems, particular decision-makers,
and particular policies. See, for examples, pp. 188, 192, 200, 36, 176, 178.
2Jessup, "Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status Between
Peace and War?", this JOURNA., Vol. 48 (1954), p. 98, and "Intermediacy," Nordisk
Tidsskrift for international Ret, Vol. 23 (1953), p. 16.
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Much confusion may be avoided by bearing in mind the fact that
by the term war is meant not the mere employment of force, but the
existence of the legal condition of things in which rights are or may
be prosecuted by force. Thus, if two nations declare war one against
the other, war exists, though no force whatever may as yet have been
employed. On the other hand, force may be employed by one nation
against another, as in the case of reprisals, and yet no state of war
may arise. In such a case there may be said to be an act of war, but
no state of war. The distinction is of the first importance, since,
from the moment when a state of war supervenes third parties become
subject to the performance of the duties of neutrality as well as to all
the inconveniences that result from the exercise of belligerent rights.
3
Note the intermingled references to factual events and "legal condition"
and the unquestioned assumption of a single meaning for all parties and
purposes. Our contemporary books abound with equivalent definitions of
war 4 and with comparable definitions of such subsidiary concepts as neu-
trality.5 The question is by what framework of inquiry can such am-
biguity, and its spawn of irrational decisions, be escaped or minimized in
maximum degree."
Search for an adequate framework of inquiry might, it is suggested,
begin with some preliminary orientation with respect to the events to which
decision-makers respond-that is, with respect to the facts of coercion across
nation-state boundaries." In highest-level abstraction these facts might
perhaps be best described as a continuous process of attack and counter-
attack in which the elites of one or more nation-states employ all instru-
3 Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. 7 (1906), p. 153.
4 Thus Hyde, International Law (2d rev. ed., 1945), Vol. 3, p. 1686: "A state of
war is a legal condition of affairs dealt with as such, and so described both by par-
ticipants and non-participanti."
Eagleton (above, note 1) offers a wide selection of such definitions of varying dates.
Wright early recognized the need for distinguishing war "in the material sense"
from war "in the legal sense." "Changes in the Conception of War,2 this JOURIAL,
Vol. 18 (1924), pp. 755, 762. He further emphasizes this need in his two-volume
study, but he also makes frequent use of a definition which runs: "War is a legal
condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by
armed force." Wright, A Study of War (1942), Vol. 2, p. 698. See also Vol. 1, p. 8.
Contrastingly, overemphasis upon the facts of coercion, and underemphasis upon the
r8le of decision-makers, is apparent in Professor Borchard's occasionally quoted query:
"Is it not a strange doctrine that would make the existence of war depend on recog-
nition by anybody?' Loc. cit., note 1, above. Quoted in Briggs, The Law of Nations
(2d rev. ed., 1951), p. 975.
5 Thus, Komarnicki, "IThe Place of Neutrality in the Modern System of Interna-
tional Law," Hague Academy of International Law, .eluei des Cours (1952), p. 401:
"Neutrality is a legal status involving certain rights and duties." Cf. Stone (note 1,
above), at p. 380.
e The mode of analysis here suggested reflects collaborative work with the writer's
colleague, Professor Harold Lasswell, and with his students, Florentino P. Feliciano,
William T. Burke, and Peter Stern.
7 Coercion, as contrasted with persuasion, may be taken to refer to constraint im-
posed either by severe deprivations or by threats of such deprivations. Such ancillary
concepts as force, violence, and conflict may be taken to refer, respectively, to coercion
directed against the well-being of the target, to intense uses of force, and to aggregates
of people in which the use of any form of coercion is intense.
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ments of policy (diplomatic, ideological, economic and military), in alterna-
tive stages of acceleration and deceleration in degrees of intensity of
coercion, against the bases of power (people, resources, institutions) of
other target nation-states, and are themselves targets in return, for ob-
jectives which range from the inducing of the target nation-states' with-
drawal, abstention, co-operation, or reconstruction in various forms to,
at the extreme of coercion, their incorporation or destruction., Each
participant or practice in this process might in any given context be made
subject to investigation in any detail necessary or possible: Just who are
the initiating and counterattacking elites and what are their overt and
covert objectives? Precisely by what practices in the use of diplomatic,
ideological, and economic instruments, interrelated how in what acts and
declarations, do they progress from less intensive measures of coercion to
the most destructive use of the military instrument? Who are the com-
batants, who attack what people and resources, in what area, by what weap-
ons, and with what degree of destruction? What measures are taken
against people, resources, and institutions in territory occupied from the
enemy or from non-participants or allies? What measures are taken
against the activities and resources of hostile persons found within an
elite's own territorial domain? What appeals are made to the officials in
international organizations (universal or regional) to take action with
respect to the coercive measures? What choices are made by elites in
nation-states other than of the initial attackers and counterattackers, with
respect to either participation in the conflict or continued or new relations
with either or both of the contending groups? By what specific practices,
with what acts and declarations, do the contending parties decelerate the
violence of their interactions and resume relations in which coercion is
less intense? Such questions are offered as suggestive merely of the gen-
eral type of preliminary factual orientation recommended.
Having obtained such preliminary orientation in the events which con-
stitute international coercion, an observer might next inquire generally
how community intervention is organized to regulate such events: What
decision-makers are authorized and maintained by what communities
(world, regional, national), to make what decisions about what particular
events, for what policy objectives, and by the application of what pre-
scriptions and procedures? The decision-makers so authorized and main-
tained might be observed to include both international officials (judges of
the International Court of Justice, arbitrators, members of the Security
Council of the United Nations, etc.) and nation-state officials, including
officials of nation-states both participant and non-participant in the co-
ercion, and both civilian (legislative, executive, and judicial) and military
(of relevant hierarchy in rank). For policy objectives relating to the
maintenance of world public order, for the enforcement of a community-
wide prohibition against unauthorized coercion, certain decision-makers
might be observed in certain contexts to discriminate, in accordance with
" Appropriate modification of this statement might of course be made to take into
account the internal conflicts commonly described as civil war.
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their authorizations, between the different coercive measures that nation-
state elites employ against each other, deciding that some measures are
non-permissible but that others are permissible, and to justify their dis-
crimination of such measures by application of a set of polar or comple-
mentary prescriptions, labeling the non-permissible coercion as "war"
or "aggression" or "breach of the peace" or "threat to the peace" and
the permissible coercion as "self-defense" or "collective self-defense" or
"collective peace enforcement" or "collective police action." For policies
relating to the promotion of universal or common responsibility for the
maintenance of world public order or, alternatively, to the limitation of the,
area and intensity of coercion, other decision-makers might be observed to
be making decisions about required participation or permissible non-par-
ticipation in collective security measures or other coercive measures and,
in the event of decision for permissible non-participation, about the inter-
relations of participants and non-participants in respect to the control of
persons, goods, and resources, and to be justifying such decisions in terms
of both conventional and customary prescriptions which dichotomize
"war" and "no-war" or "neutrality," or "belligerency" and "non-
belligerency." For determining the permissibility or non-permissibility
of a great variety of controls over people and resources, with respect to
both a participant nation-state's own nationals and enemy nationals, other
decision-makers might be observed to be appraising the degrees of in-
tensity of coercion in attack and counterattack and justifying decisions
in terms of prescriptions which distinguish the "initiation" of "war"
from the continuance of "peace." For promoting the minimum destruc-
tion of values in situations of conflict, contexts in which the prohibition of
coercion has failed, still other decision-makers might be observed to be
passing upon the legitimacy of combatants, of objects of attack, of areas
of attack, of weapons and degrees of destruction, and of various controls
over people and resources in areas occupied from an enemy, and to be
justifying decisions by invocation of complementary prescriptions about
"military necessity" and "humanitarianism" or "reprisals" and "pro-
portionality of reprisals." For determining the continued legitimacy of
a wide variety of controls over people and resources, with respect to both
a participant nation-state's own nationals and enemy nationals, still other
decision-makers might, for final example, be observed to be appraising a
decelerating intensity of coercion and to be justifying decisions in terms
of the "termination" or continuance of "war."
From the perspective of such orientation with respect to both the facts
of international coercion and the responses made by authoritative decision-
makers to such facts, an observer might reasonably conclude that the tech-
nical terms "peace" and "war," and all their subsidiary, dichotomous,
and complementary prescriptions, insofar as they refer to the facts of
coercion, embrace between their polar extremes a continuum, of coercive
practices of infinitely varying modalities and degrees of intensity, and,
9 Description in terms of a continuum is employed by both Schwarzenberger and
Wright, cited above, note 1.
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insofar as they refer to the responises of decision-makers, encompass a
variety of decision and of justification for decision as various as the facts,
the decision-makers, and the policies of decision-makers. Between the polar
extremes of the lowest and highest degrees of coercion there is not one
stage of intermediacy but countless stages, and in their employment of
"war" and "peace" and other terms, decision-makers exhibit not two
or three, but highly selective multiple, references.'
An organization of studies for more detailed inquiry into the facts and
decisions about international coercion might appropriately take into ac-
count their variety. The mode of organization we recommend would begin
by seeking to categorize the facts to which decision-makers respond in
terms which facilitate both the identification and clarification of relevant
community policies and the description and appraisal of trends in de-
cision. The type of categorization proposed may perhaps be best indicated
by pointing, in rough and merely suggestive terms, to certain broad areas,
within which the particular events to which decision-makers respond could
be refined with any precision necessary, such as the following:
1. The employment by nation-state elites of the military instrument
in direct attack or the intensification of coercion by use of other in-
struments in such degree as to create reasonable expectations in target
elites and others of imminent attack with the military instrument.
The policy issue here is that of preventing or repressing unauthorized
coercion and of maintaining the world public order.
2. Choices by elites with respect to participation or non-participation
in coercive processes of high degree of intensity initiated by others.
Policy issues here relate both to the application of "charter" commit-
ments requiring participation in collective measures to prevent or
repress unauthorized coercion and, where non-participation is per-
missible, to regulating the interactions of participants and non-partici-
pants in modes best designed both to promote world public order and
to minimize the coercive destruction of values.
3. The initiation by elites of measures of highly intense coercion,
as in categorization No. 1 above, in a context in which the reasonable
expectations of target elites and others are that community efforts to
prevent or quickly suppress the use of the military instrument will
fail. The policy issue here is when various world prescriptions, de-
signed both to protect security interests and to minimize the destruc-
tion of values, become applicable to the conduct of operations with the
military instrument, to the exercise of many different controls over
people and resources, of both national and non-national origin, and
to interactions of participants and non-participants. Particular events
may be both internal and external to the nation-state of the decision-
maker and relevant prescriptions may include both world and national.
4. The conduct of hostilities by elites employing the military instru-
ment against the bases of power of their enemies. Policy issues re-
10 Some of the difficulties that others have found with states of intermediacy are
recounted by Komarnieki, Zoo. cit. (note 5, above), Oh. II.
One can only marvel at the restraint of Stone, who writes "... it is likely that
clarity will only be approached in this problem by recognizing that the question 'War
or No Wary may have to be answered differently according to the purposes for which
an answer is sought"; but concludes that "No such differentiation can be said as yet
to have emerged in practice." Op. cit. (note 1, above), at pp. 312, 313.
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quire determination, by a balancing in appropriate context of prin-
ciples of military necessity against principles of humanity, of permis-
sible combatants, permissible areas of operation, permissible objects
of attack, and permissible weapons and degrees of destruction.
5. The exercise of various controls over people and resources by
belligerent elites in territory occupied during the course of hostilities
from the enemy. Policy issues require a balancing of the security
and other military interests of the occupant against the human rights
of the inhabitants. Military occupation after the cessation of hostilities
raises very different policy issues and, hence, requires careful dis-
tinction.
6. The exercise by contending elites of a great variety of controls
over enemy persons and resources located within their own territorial
domain. The policy issues again contrapose military necessity and the
minimum destruction of values.
7. The deceleration by elites of the degree of intensity of coercion,
with concomitant effects ranging from relaxation of controls over per-
sons and resources, both enemy and national, to the partial or total
incorporation of enemy persons and resources. The broadest policy
issue here is when the prescriptions appropriate to situations of con-
flict cease to be relevant and other prescriptions, better designed for
securing a future world order, become applicable.
Such major areas of investigation could be expanded in number as the
facts of coercion might make necessary and, within such major areas, sub-
categorization might be made in any degree required for the precise de-
scription of particular events. With some such organization of inquiry,
it might be possible more adequately to perform with respect tb the prob-
lems of international coercion certain intellectual tasks, indispensable to the
dispelling of ambiguity in the formulation of issues and of irrationality
in decision, which include: the clarification of fundamental community
policies, the description of trends in decision and conditioning variables,
the appraisal of decisions for conformity with clarified community policies,
and the invention and recommendation of alternative prescriptions and
procedures. 1
In the contemporary posture of world affairs the urgent need for such
inquiry is not likely to be exaggerated.
MYRES S. McDouGAL
JIDENTITY OF STATES UNDER INTEIRATIONAL LAW
These troubled times since 1914 have seen the coming into existence,
transformation, extinction, and resurrection of many states. Whereas in
many cases no difficulty has arisen in determining whether a certain state
is a new state 1 or iddiitical with a pre-existing state,2 there are many
11 Some amplification of what is intended by these "intellectual tasks" is offered
in M fDougal, "International Law, Power, and Policy," Hague Academy of Interna-
tional Law, Recucil des Cours (1953).
Thus Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic Republics, Finland, Iraq after the first
World War, and Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Israel, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Pakistan
after the second World War.
2 Thus the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union, although the latter denied its
identity with the Russian Empire.
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